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Abstract​. Research in law, political science and economics has taken a strong interest in the               
way companies strategically incorporate in foreign jurisdictions. However, the empirical          
research about corporate mobility in the EU has so far been limited in two respects: it has                 
focused on the analysis of foreign companies in the UK and it has mainly been concerned                
with differences in the costs of incorporation such as minimum capital requirements. This             
paper aims to fill these gaps. It is the first paper that presents data on incorporations of                 
foreign businesses in the commercial registers of each EU Member State. It is also the first                
one to assess the impact of differences in the conflict of laws rules applicable to companies as                 
they reflect the case law of the Court of Justice on the freedom of establishment. It finds that                  
countries which have a clear-cut version of the ‘incorporation theory’ attract more            
incorporations than countries which have retained elements of the ‘real seat theory’. The             
paper also discusses the policy implications from these findings for EU harmonisation in this              
field. 
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Introduction 
Do companies make strategic decisions to incorporate in certain jurisdictions following a            
search for the most favourable legal rules? This is likely to be the case as far as this choice                   
allows businesses to reduce their tax bill, whether directly, or by benefitting from lower              
levels of transparency. As far as company law is concerned, a prerequisite for meaningful              2
choice of law is the ability of firms to freely and separately choose their place of                
incorporation, regardless of the physical location of their activities. Countries that follow the             
‘incorporation theory’ recognise any company properly constituted according to the law of            
another country, and accept that the company law of the country of incorporation applies to               
such companies. Notably, this is the case in (and within) the US, with the result that many                 
listed US companies choose Delaware as their place of incorporation (for US-EU            
comparisons see e.g. Ventoruzzo et al., 2015: 35-97; Mucciarelli, 2012). By contrast,            
countries following the ‘real-seat theory’ seek to prevent free and separate choice of company              
law by determining the law applicable to a company by reference to the location of its                
headquarters; this effectively requires companies to incorporate in the jurisdiction from it is             
managed. 
In the European Union, an interesting situation has emerged. The freedom of establishment             
enshrined in the Treaty and the corresponding case law of the Court of Justice have led to a                  
general shift towards the ‘incorporation theory’; yet, it can also be observed that some              
Member States have retained some elements of the ‘real seat’ theory (see 2.1 and 4.2, below).                
Thus, this paper aims to explore the impact of the resulting differences on the incorporation               
behaviour of firms. It also fills gaps in the previous empirical literature on this topic, as it is                  
limited in at least two respects: following the scenario of the landmark case in this area                
(​Centros​), it has focused on the analysis of foreign-based companies in the UK and it has                
mainly been concerned with differences in the costs of incorporation, such as the minimum              
capital requirements (see 2.2, below). By contrast, this paper presents data on all             
incorporations of foreign businesses in the commercial registers of each Member State today.             
It is also the first one to examine the impact of differences in the conflict of laws rules                  
applicable to companies. This is an essential question to explore since the EU Commission              
seems to be considering proposing a new European instrument to harmonise these conflict of              
laws rules.  3
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the problem of the law on                 
corporate mobility in the EU, it provides an overview of the previous empirical research and               
it explains the data collection of the present study. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics of               
foreign-based private companies in all Member States today as well as time series data on               
new incorporations in the UK since 1990. These new data are one of the innovations of this                 
paper. They also provide an initial assessment of whether there is a meaningful market for               
incorporations in the EU. The regression analysis in Section 4 turns to the question of               
whether the country differences can be explained by differences in conflict of laws rules              
2 As illustrated by the so-called ‘Panama Papers’, see 2.2 (final paragraph), below. 
3 See the consultation ‘EU Company law upgraded: Rules on digital solutions and efficient cross-border 
operations’ (10 May 2017), available at http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=58190. 
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applicable to companies as well as other factors. The concluding Section 5 reflects on the               
wider implications of the findings, including the possible impact of the result of the UK’s               
‘Brexit-referendum’. 
2. Background, previous research and data collection 
2.1 Background and overview of legal situation in the EU 
In the EU, despite partial harmonisation of substantive rules, companies are mostly creatures             
of national law. As a starting point, conflict of laws rules determining the law applicable to                
companies (​lex societatis​) are similarly determined at the Member State level; they may thus              
apply either the ‘incorporation theory’ or the ‘real seat theory’. This has important             
implications for corporate mobility since countries following the ‘real seat theory’ would            
effectively not accept it, if a business incorporated in a jurisdiction other than that of its                
headquarters. 
The case law of the Court of Justice, interpreting the freedom of establishment of Article 49                4
of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union has led to some liberalisation               
regarding the freedom of selecting the preferred ​lex societatis​. Although the Court generally             
does not phrase its arguments in the categories of conflict of laws rules, it has become clear                 
that its case law has imposed some restrictions on the use of the real seat theory for                 
companies from other Member States. This became most obvious in the landmark case of              
Centros​: two Danish citizens living in Denmark established a limited liability company (ltd)             
in the UK. The founders’ main motivation was to avoid the minimum capital requirements              
under Danish law. Even though it is somewhat unclear whether Denmark followed the real              
seat doctrine at the time, the Danish authorities refused to register a branch of Centros ltd in                 
the commercial register because it did not plan to conduct business anywhere except in              
Denmark. The Court of Justice rejected this line of reasoning and held that Centros ltd was                
validly exercising its freedom of establishment and that the refusal to register was an obstacle               
to this freedom. 
However, the Court also affirmed that Denmark was ‘entitled to take measures designed to              
prevent certain of its nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the               
Treaty, improperly to circumvent their national legislation or to prevent individuals from            
improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of [the freedoms]’. ​In addition, the case law of              5
the Court of Justice has emphasised repeatedly that it is possible for Member States to               
4 ​Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen​ (1999) C-212/97; ​Überseering BV v Nordic Construction 
Company Baumanagement GmbH​ (2002) C-208/00; ​Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v 
Inspire Art Ltd.​ (2003) C-167/01; ​SEVIC Sytems AG v Amtsgericht Neuwied​ (2005) C-411/03; ​Cartesio Oktato 
es Szolgaltato bt​ (2008) C- 210/06; ​VALE Építési kft.​ (2012) C-210/06; C-106/16, ​Polbud – Wykonawstwo sp. z 
o.o​ (2017) C-106/16. 
5 ​Centros​, ibid, at paras. 24-25. 
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provide that incorporations in their own jurisdiction are tied to the requirement that the              
company has its headquarters, or other physical elements, in this country.  6
Thus, the Court of Justice has left some ambiguities about the possibility of corporate              
mobility. It is therefore possible to distinguish between Member States that have a clear-cut              
version of the ‘incorporation theory’ and those that have retained some elements of the ‘real               
seat’ theory (see 4.2, below). Correspondingly, it is not clear whether it can be said that, at                 
present, there is a meaningful market for incorporations in the EU, thus raising the question               
how widespread it is that companies have their ‘real seat’ in a Member State different from                
the state of incorporation. This paper will attempt to answer these questions. 
2.2 Previous empirical research 
A European study on the application of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive explained the             
problems with collecting statistical data on questions of cross-border company mobility and            
on cross-border mergers in particular, as follows: 
‘Collecting this data proved extremely challenging, as the information that the national            
registries keep is partial, and the commercial databases were inconsistent and           
scarce. Indeed, previous studies on parallel topics encountered the same problems in            
gathering accurate and quality information’ (Bech-Bruun and Lexidale 2013: 962). 
The task of collecting data on the number of companies that operate in a Member State                
different from the one in which they have been incorporated or have their real seat is also a                  
demanding one. To start with, it is therefore helpful to present an overview of the scope and                 
method of the existing empirical research which has aimed to tackle this problem. 
Table 1. Overview of empirical research on corporate mobility in the EU  7
Paper Topic / countries and time frame  
Methodology of data collection 
Armour 
(2005) 
German 
businesses 
incorporatin
g as UK ltds 
1999 
to 
2004 
● Identified companies in the Companies House database, which 
had a largely German-language name and the name was ending 
with ‘Limited’  
● Acknowledged limitations: data merely impressionistic, 
potentially under or over-inclusive 
Becht et 
al. 
(2008) 
Businesses 
from EEA 
countries 
incorporatin
g as UK ltds 
1997 
to 
2006 
● Data obtained from the FAME database (Bureau van Dijk); 
where FAME data was incomplete, correction factors were 
applied (based on a comparison between FAME and Companies 
House databases)  
● Directors’ residence as main criterion (with 50% and 100% 
thresholds) 
6 This goes back to the decision in ​The Queen v HM Treasury and Commissioners for Inland Revenue, ex p 
Daily Mail and General Trust plc​ (1988) C-81/87 and was confirmed in ​Cartesio Oktato es Szolgaltato bt 
(2008) C- 210/06; ​VALE Építési kft.​ (2012) C-210/06. 
7 In addition, empirical studies, not discussed here, have analysed the incorporation of businesses as a European 
Company (SE), see e.g. Eidenmüller et al., 2010. 
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Becht et 
al. 
(2009) 
Registration 
of branches 
of UK ltds in 
ten Member 
States 
2006 ● Data obtained through field experiments with assistance from 
country correspondents who reported on their attempts to 
incorporate and branch back a UK ltd 
● Information recorded in the experiments includes the number of 
procedures involved, their cost and duration, as well as any 
obstacles encountered 
Laa-ma
nen et 
al. 
(2012) 
Relocation 
of HQs in 17 
European 
countries 
1996 
to 
2006 
● News databases by Lexis/Nexis and Reuters; further internet 
checks 
● Data mainly capture larger public companies 
Braun 
et al. 
(2013) 
Incorporatio
n of private 
companies in
five Member 
States 
One 
year 
+/-la
w 
refor
m 
● Most data collected from the AMADEUS database (Bureau van 
Dijk); for Germany and Poland, data collected directly from 
national company registers  
● Directors’ residence as main criterion  
Muller 
et al. 
(2013) 
Cross-border 
mobility of 
SEs 
and  
transfers of 
registered 
offices 
2009 
to 
2011 
and 
2007 
to 
2012 
● Regarding mobility of SEs, the European Trade Union 
Institute’s European Company database was used together with 
the Orbis database (Bureau van Dijk) 
● Regarding mobility of other companies, national business 
registers were directly contacted, generally to no avail 
(exception: Malta); indirect data collection (matching 
de-registrations with new registrations, Zephyr database used to 
track cross-border mergers) 
Bech-Br
unn & 
Lexidal
e (2013) 
Cross-border 
mergers in 
EU 
2008 
to 
2012 
● Timing of reincorporation tracked through direct and indirect 
enquiries (Thomson Knowledge, LexisNexis, Thomson Reuters) 
● Further information collected from various reports and the 
European Trade Union Institute 
Ringe 
(2013) 
German and 
Austrian 
businesses 
incorporatin
g as UK ltds 
2004 
to 
2011 
● Data on German and Austrian companies collected from the 
Companies House via FAME database 
● Centros​ type companies identified if company incorporated in 
the UK with at least one German director where the company 
shares its registered office with at least 100 other companies 
(proxy for the involvement of an incorporation agency) 
Sick 
(2015) 
German 
business 
with > 500 
employees 
incorporated 
in foreign 
legal form 
1995 
to 
2014 
● Combination of primary and secondary data sources, including: 
Federal Gazette’s company reports, previous studies, corporate 
websites and other corporate databases 
Teichm
ann and 
Knaier 
(2015) 
Austrian 
businesses 
incorporatin
g as German 
companies 
2009 
to 
2012 
● Data derived from the German Commercial Register by the 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag 
● German ‘letterbox’ companies (GmbHs / UGs) doing business 
in Austria were identified when shareholder is also the 
managing director and lives where the company does its main 
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business 
 
This literature suggests different proxies to identify the country with which companies are             
mostly connected, despite being incorporated in another jurisdiction. It has been observed            
that the registration of branches is not strictly enforced in many Member States (Becht et al.,                
2008: 245). Therefore, the most promising strategy is to proceed indirectly by examining the              
company’s filings in the state of incorporation. One possibility is to use the address of the                
directors as an indication of the company’s real seat. The proxy can be further varied by, for                 
example, classifying a company as formally foreign if all directors live abroad, or if the               
majority lives abroad (as used by used by Becht et al., 2008; Braun et al., 2013). As far as the                    
information is available, it can also be revealing to identify whether the managing director is               
also a shareholder (or even the sole shareholder) (as used by Teichmann and Knaier, 2015). 
Alternatively, one may go further and aim to collect information about companies without             
any physical connection of the company to the country of incorporation. In order to identify               
such companies some studies have examined whether the company’s registered office was            
shared with at least 100 other companies – i.e. it having a mere ‘letterbox’ in the country of                  
incorporation. This is said to work reasonably well for the UK where registration agents use               
the same address for a large number of companies without any business activity in the state of                 
incorporation (Ringe, 2013: 247), while in other countries this strategy is less reliable. 
In this respect, a terminological and substantial clarification has to be made. In the literature,               
the term ‘letterbox companies’ is occasionally used for such companies that do business in              
one country, but are incorporated with only a ‘letterbox’ in another one (Sørensen, 2015).              
However, frequently, the term ‘letterbox companies’ is also equated with companies which            
are mere ‘special purpose entities’ (SPEs, also called ‘conduit companies’). Those too merely             
have a ‘letterbox’ in the country of incorporation, but they only hold financial assets, they are                
not involved in business activity in any country, and their main purpose is to benefit from the                 
tax advantages that can be gained by using SPEs as intermediate legal entities (see e.g.               
Eurodad, 2015: 18-19; UNCTAD, 2015: 189-190). This type of letterbox companies is often             
associated with companies established in offshore tax havens, for example in the British             
Virgin Islands, but such regimes also exist in some EU Member States (Eurodad, ibid:              8
Luxembourg, Austria, Cyprus, Hungary, Spain). Those companies are not of core interest to             
the present paper as, due to their lack of business activity, they are unlikely to raise problems                 
of conflict of laws rules applicable to companies resulting from a mismatch between place of               
incorporation and real seat. 
2.3 Data collection of this study 
EU law requires the registration of companies in the commercial registers of the Member              
States, and as of June 2017, those registers are interconnected at EU level as part of the                 
8 As discussed, following the leaked information from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, see eg 
‘Panama Papers: How assets are hidden and taxes dodged’ (BBC News, 3 April 2016), available at 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35943740. 
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Business Registers Interconnection System (BRIS). At present, however, the commercial          9
registers do not provide researchers with deep-level access to company data from all Member              
States. While it is possible to identify the websites of the commercial registers, searching              10
for data about all companies established in the EU presents various practical problems: the              
websites are usually only available in the official language of the country in question and its                
search functions are often very limited. Furthermore, deep-level access to the information that             
is of interest to this study, such as the nationality and addresses of directors, is not freely                 
available but instead is typically charged per access to information on each individual             
company. It is therefore not feasible to compile a comprehensive dataset of the millions of               
European companies through the websites of the commercial registers.  
A more promising path is to make use of the commercial databases provided by Bureau van                
Dijk (BvD). Some of those databases cover company data for specific countries, but, for our               11
purposes, it is helpful that all of the national databases of European countries are integrated in                
the BvD’s general database Orbis. Since Orbis is composed of information from various             12
domestic sources, the completeness of the information varies between countries. For most            
Member States, the coverage of the companies included is good (see also 3.1, below), but               
there are some exceptions. The most notable one concerns the Greek data where many              
companies are missing. A query to BvD confirmed that their data only cover about 5% of the                 
active businesses in Greece. 
The present analysis focuses on private companies, since, in the EU, it is mainly those               
companies that have shown to be interested in foreign incorporations. Orbis has a search              13
function that allows for the search of ‘standardised legal forms’, but it is more reliable to                
choose manually the precise types of company for each of the Member States. This leads to a                 
list of 14.7 million private companies incorporated in all Member States. Subsequently, we             
restricted the search to those companies where at least one director or senior manager is from                
a foreign country. For our purposes, it makes sense to exclude someone who runs a business                
in another Member State but establishes a company in his or her country of nationality. In the                 
regression analysis (see 4, below), we are interested in persons who want to incorporate              
companies in another Member State despite having no special attachment to that country. The              
situation is different for nationals of that other country. For example, the control variable of a                
common language can be one of the variables explaining why a businessperson from Portugal              
9 The former is based on ​according to ​Directive 2009/101/EC, art. 3 and the latter on Directive 2012/17/EU and 
the Commission implementing regulation (EU) 2015/884. For the BRIS see also 
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_business_registers_at_european_level-105-en.do. 
10 List of register provided at 
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_business_registers_in_member_states-106-en.do and 
www.ebr.org/index.php/member-countries/. 
11 See www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/company-information/national. 
12 The other general BvD database, focussing on European data, is Amadeus. However, searching for company 
data from 2014 and 2015, we established that Orbis is more frequently updated since many of these data are not 
yet available through Amadeus. 
13 See Table 1, above. This is different from the situation in the US where the market of incorporations is mainly 
about re-incorporations of larger listed companies (though not only, see Dammann and Schündeln, 2013). For 
the possibility of re-incorporations in the EU see Gerner-Beuerle et al. 2018a. 
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may not incorporate a Finnish company, but this argument would not apply if this person               
were a Finnish national who runs his or her own business in Portugal with a company                
incorporated in Finland. 
This search operation reduces the number of private companies available to a manageable             
size of 1.1 million companies. We also had to check to what extent this might exclude                
relevant information. In total, 63% of the private companies from all Member States provide              
information about the nationality of their directors and senior managers. For 13 of the 28               
Member States, however, less than 50% of the companies include such information.            
However, generally speaking, for those countries any other information that may be helpful             
for the purposes of the present research is even less likely to be available in Orbis. Thus, the                  
best that can be done is to use means of extrapolation as far as the data are incomplete, and,                   
in the regression analysis, include control variables for the proportion of companies included             
in the dataset. We also checked for the robustness of any findings by way of excluding the                 
countries where only limited data are available (see 3.1 and 4, below). 
In the Orbis search results, we selected a number of fields relevant for the purposes of our                 
research, also considering the proxies suggested by previous research (see 2.2, above). Thus,             
for the main parts of the analysis, we downloaded information about (i) the address and               
contact details of the company, (ii) the number of current directors and managers, their              
nationality, place of residence and job title, and (iii) the nature of the company’s              
shareholders, namely whether they are also the directors or senior managers of the company              
and whether they are natural or legal persons. While it would be interesting to have further                
details about the companies in question, for example, their employees and their business             
locations, those data are rarely available for private companies. 
The Orbis category ‘directors and managers’ does not disclose which positions Orbis            
classifies under this heading. For most private companies, the main persons reported here are              
the executive directors/managers, but for some of the bigger private companies it may also              
include other managers with the authority to act on behalf of the company. We suggest that                14
it is justifiable to consider all of these positions in order to identify the companies of interest                 
in this paper since they can be indicators of the ‘real seat’ of a company. For the companies                  
established in the UK, we also filtered the search results so as to only include the companies’                 
directors, but the actual findings were very similar – with a correlation of close to 0.99.  15
Some of the current empirical literature examines not the total number of incorporated             
companies but the new incorporations in a particular year (e.g., Becht et al., 2008; Braun et                
al., 2013). For the purposes of the present study, we aimed to identify all new foreign                
incorporations from 1990 to 2015. Using the ‘segmentation by year’ function provided by             
14 Since this paper is concerned with private companies, the problem did not arise whether this category would 
also include the members of supervisory boards of some public companies (such as the ​Aufsichtsrat​ in the 
German ​Aktiengesellschaft​). 
15 Correlation of 0.9889 between (i) the 27 observations that count the number of ltds that have a board of 
directors only consisting of persons from one of the other 27 Member States and (ii) the 27 observations that 
count the number of ltds where all ‘directors and managers’ are from one of the other 27 Member States. 
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Orbis, this can, in principle, be achieved without downloading all of the data. However,              16
sufficiently long and reliable time series data are only available for few of the Member States,                
notably the UK. We will therefore only use time series data for parts of subsequent analysis                
(see 3.1 and 3.3, below). 
3. Descriptive statistics 
3.1 Estimation of foreign-incorporated companies 
While Orbis is a valuable global resource for information about companies, any search for              
specific details has to address its variations in data availability: variations between countries             
but also those between the relevant information about directors and senior managers (in the              
following, the term ‘managers’ will be used to refer to both of these groups). We therefore                
ascertained that for ten Member States less than 50% of the companies with at least one                
foreign manager provide information about the residence of at least one manager. In addition,              
as far as information is included in the Orbis data, it is often not useful since it does not                   
mention the private address of the manager but simply restates the company’s address.  
Thus, instead of the residence of managers, the following analysis is based on their              
nationality. Moreover, the Orbis categories ‘managers being shareholders’ and ‘shareholders          
being natural or legal persons’ may be relevant since the foreign-incorporated companies that             
are of interest for this study are typically companies where natural persons are the main               
shareholders as well as the managers of the company. The information about ‘managers being              
shareholders’ is particularly well reported; thus, it will be used in the following in order to                
capture ‘Centros-type’ companies and exclude group structures such as the aforementioned           
special purpose entities (see 2.1 and 2.2, above). 
Table 2: Top-ten target countries of businesses incorporated in other Member States            
(estimation of all companies excluding companies established by residents) 
Country  Number of companies Multiplicator 
1. UK 227,064 1.7329 
2. Estonia 33,524 7.4270 
3. Romania 30,123 1.0126 
4. France 27,029 25.1569 
5. Slovakia 26,600 1.8165 
6. Luxembourg 10,631 4.5478 
7. Czech Republic 8,923 1.0297 
8. Ireland 8,058 2.5086 
9. Germany 7,866 1.5858 
16 While Orbis only allows the search of companies with at least one director/senior manager from a particular 
country, it is possible to search for all companies with any directors from all countries of the world with the 
exception of this particular country, which can then be deducted from the total number of companies with 
information about the nationality of directors/senior managers. 
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10. Cyprus 4,886 11.32309 
All Member States 420,429  
Note: the ‘multiplicator’ corrects for variations in data availability 
(higher values indicate less reliable data) 
Table 2 presents the estimated top-ten target countries. Following on from the considerations             
about possible proxies and data availability, it is based on companies with all managers being               
from any Member States other than the country of incorporation and the majority of those               
managers being shareholders. The raw target data have been extrapolated to estimate the total              
number of those companies across Member States, using the multiplicator. Subsequently,           
based on migration data provided by the UN, it has been estimated how many of the                
companies have been established by foreigners who are resident in the country of             
incorporation, a figure deducted from the number in the target data.  17
In order to check the robustness of this nationality-based method of establishing            
foreign-incorporated companies, we compared our findings with the study of UK           
incorporations in the years 1997 to 2006 by Becht et al. (2008). For UK companies               
established in those years, it was still common to indicate the actual address of managers in                
the commercial register. Thus, we could compare the Becht et al. data with our time series                
(see 3.3, below) of foreign UK incorporations, the latter being based on the nationality of               
managers but then deducting the number of companies which were likely to be established by               
foreigners, resident in the UK at the time of incorporation (again, using the UN migration               
data). Both datasets are highly correlated (0.986) which gives us confidence in our technique              
of identifying companies established by foreigners who also live in their country of             
nationality. 
3.2 Interpretation and network presentation 
In substance, it follows from Table 2 that the UK is by far the most popular target country,                  
accounting for about 50% of the foreign incorporations. The UK is followed by four Central               
and Eastern European (CEE) countries in the top seven (Estonia, Romania, Slovakia, and             
Czech Republic), as well two further common law countries (Ireland and Cyprus) and three              
Western European countries (France, Luxembourg and Germany). 
Generally speaking, it is doubtful why in the EU law makers may want to attract foreign                
incorporations. Member States lack the financial incentives that have influenced Delaware in            
the market for incorporations in the US. Usually, no periodic franchise tax or similar charge               
is levied by EU Member States, and when a company is founded, only administrative costs               
are typically charged. In principle, no other fiscal motives exist, since, usually, factors largely              
equivalent to the ‘real seat’ concept are decisive for the determination of a company’s tax               
domicile. Moreover, irrespective of the legal structure, physical permanent establishments are           
generally taxed based on their location. For the individual Member States, accordingly, there             
remains, on the one hand, a possible prestige gain as a non-material advantage. On the other,                
17 Thus, the following formula was used for each country pair with I = country of incorporation and M = country 
of managers: absolute value (raw data – migrants from M in I * companies per capita in I). The population data 
are from ww.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml. 
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Member States where foreign firms choose their registered seat may profit from more clients              
for lawyers and other consultants, thus collecting more taxes and creating more jobs (for all               
of these considerations see Siems, 2008: 321-2). 
There are, however, also some reasons why some of the CEE countries have become popular               
target countries for foreign incorporations. After the fall of communism, the business laws of              
the CEE countries have been going through various phases of reform, thereby increasing the              
potential of some of them to attract foreign incorporations. An internet search also shows a               
number of web sites that promote incorporation of businesses in Estonia, Romania and             
Slovakia. Moreover, it is likely that the situation in the CEE countries is not only about                18
matters of company law, but is also related to other areas of law such as favourable tax and                  
labour laws. For example, we may think about the situation of a Finnish businesswoman who               
registers a private company in Estonia and rents an office there, but keeps her own residence                
in Finland from where she manages the company. Such a scenario is therefore different from               
the scenario where the company has no physical connection to the country of incorporation at               
all. However, such companies too are of interest for our purposes since the Finnish              
businesswoman could also have incorporated the company in Finland while merely renting an             
office in Estonia. The question of how far the place of incorporation is a deliberate choice –                 
and therefore the impact of differences in conflict of laws rules – is therefore also relevant in                 
this scenario. 
To get a fuller picture of the relationship between origin and target countries, it is necessary                
to consider the information for all countries, namely the matrix of each pair of possible               
countries which leads to 28 x 27 = 756 observations. This information can be presented as a                 
network. Such a network presentation is helpful as it enables us to see whether cases of                
foreign incorporations are isolated or widespread (and thus, in the latter case, indicating that              
there may be an emerging market for incorporations in the EU). 
18 See, e.g., www.estoniancompanyregistration.com/, www.companyincorporationestonia.com/, 
www.romania-company.com/, www.theromanianclub.com/, www.slovenskespolocnosti.sk/en, 
http://zugimpex.com/slovakia-company.html. 
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Figure 1: Network of businesses incorporated in other Member States 
 
Note: ties present 50 or more businesses incorporated abroad based on estimation of             
foreign-incorporated companies (as explained in previous section) 
Figure 1 displays all of the country pairs that have a tie-strength of at least 50: i.e., based on                   
the estimated figures, there are at least 50 businesses from the origin country that incorporate               
a company in the target country. The direction of the arrows indicates which country is the                19
origin and which is the target country. The network analysis program was also instructed to               
shift the position of countries according to the strength of their relationships using the              
technique of ‘spring embedding’. The figure shows that the UK is the centre of this mobility                
network. Many of the other close connections match geographic and linguistic similarities            
(e.g., Cyprus and Greece; the Czech Republic and Slovakia; Slovenia and Croatia; Sweden,             
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).  
Table 3: Clusters of legal systems based on foreign incorporations 
Clusters Countries 
19 Based on the scheme of the UN Statistics Division (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm), 
the colours of the nodes indicate the geographic classification into Eastern, Northern, Southern and Western 
European countries. 
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2 
(r​2​=0.053) 
AT BG CZ FR DE HU IE IT NL PL PT RO 
SK ES UK 
BE HR CY DK EE FI EL LV LT LU MT SI SE 
3 
(r​2​=0.101) 
AT BE CY CZ EL HU LU 
SK SI 
HR DK EE FI LV LT MT SE BG FR DE IE IT NL PL PT RO 
ES UK 
4 
(r​2​=0.146) 
AT BE CZ DE 
HU LU SK 
DK EE FI LV LT 
NL SE 
BG FR IE IT PL RO ES UK HR CY EL MT PT SI 
5 
(r​2​=0.190) 
AT HR CZ 
HU SK SI 
EE FI LV 
LT SE 
FR DE IE IT PL 
RO UK 
BG CY DK EL NL BE LU MT PT ES 
6 
(r​2​=0.232) 
FR IE IT 
PL RO UK 
CZ HU SK 
SI 
EE FI LV LT 
SE 
BG HR CY 
EL 
AT BE DE LU 
NL 
DK MT PT ES 
7 
(r​2​=0.271) 
FR IE IT 
PL RO UK 
DK PT ES 
SE 
EE FI 
LV LT 
BG CY EL HR 
MT SI 
BE DE LU 
NL 
AT CZ HU SK 
8 
(r​2​=0.308) 
IE IT PL 
RO UK 
CZ HU 
SK 
BE DE 
LU NL 
FR PT 
ES 
BG CY 
EL 
AT HR SI EE FI LV 
LT 
DK MT 
SE 
9 
(r​2​=0.346) 
HR 
MT SI 
EE FI 
LV 
IE IT PL 
RO UK 
DK LT 
SE 
FR PT 
ES 
CZ HU 
SK 
BG CY 
EL 
AT DE 
NL 
BE 
LU 
10 
(r​2​=0.375) 
EE FI 
LV 
HR 
SI 
LT 
MT 
BE 
LU 
IE IT PL 
RO UK 
FR PT 
ES 
CZ HU 
SK 
BG CY 
EL 
DK SE AT DE 
NL 
Note: calculations based on network of foreign incorporations (see Figure 1, above); this tables uses               
the official EU abbreviations (as available at http://publications.europa.eu/code/en/en-370100.htm)        
for the names of the Member States. 
The closeness, according to these network data, can also be established more formally.             
Network analysis provides various tools to identify community structures (Ferligoj et al.,            
2011). Some of those tools rely on binary data, but for a valued network – such as the current                   
one – it is preferable to use tools that consider the full information in the dataset. One such                  
method is to calculate ‘optimisation clusters’. This refers to a formal method that ‘optimises a               
cost function which measures the total distance or similarity within classes for a proximity              
matrix’.  20
Optimisation clusters require that the researcher specifies in advance how many clusters shall             
be created. In Table 3 this has been done, based on the absolute number of incorporations, for                 
up to ten clusters since, with more clusters, we would often only have clusters of only one or                  
two countries. The table also indicates how well the respective clusters explain the entire              
dataset (R​2​). It can be seen that this number is low for the divisions with few clusters, but that                   
it gradually increases with more clusters being added. For example, the eight-cluster division             
can then be seen as a plausible one, consisting of the following clusters (in the order from the                  
table): a mixed one, an Eastern European one, a Western European one, a South-West and a                
South-East European one, a Central European one, and two mainly Nordic-Baltic ones.  
It is also revealing to ‘track’ the position of individual countries throughout the ten clusters.               
The following groups of countries are always in the same respective cluster: the Czech              
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary; Finland, Estonia and Latvia; Poland, Romania and Italy;            
the UK and Ireland; Cyprus and Greece; and Belgium and Luxembourg. These groups may              
be seen as intuitive ones as they are those of neighbouring countries with further linguistic,               
20 Definition at www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/2cvtid.htm. 
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social and economic similarities (a point further evaluated in the regression analysis, 4,             
below). For the purposes of this paper, however, it also shows the rather limited effect of the                 
freedom of establishment of the Treaty, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, on the mobility                
of companies ​across all​ Member States. 
3.3 Time series of new incorporations in the UK (1990-2015) 
As already mentioned (see 2.3, above), reliable time-series data about incorporations are not             
available across all Member States. The UK data are a rare exception. The following reports               
the time series for incorporations of foreign-based ltds in the UK (i.e. with all directors being                
shareholders and nationals from another Member State but deducting the companies           
established by foreigners living in the UK). As the scale of incorporations differs             
considerably, the part of Figure 2 reports the eight countries with the highest numbers of               
foreign incorporations, the second one the next eight countries, and the third one the              
remaining Member States. 
Figure 2: Time series of newly incorporated foreign-based UK ltds 1990-2015  
 
 
14 
 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics 
Vol. 56, 14-27. Published version available from: ​https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2018.05.002 
Accepted version made available from SOAS Research Online from:  ​http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25962/​ under 
CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International License 
 
  
Figure 2 shows that prior to the 2000s most curves were flat, then followed by a rise of                  
foreign ltd incorporations, first, in some of the pre-2004 Member States (notably, Germany,             
Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria), and in the 2010s across all Member States (both              
‘old’ and ‘new’ ones). In some Member States, there has been a rise of UK ltd incorporations                 
but then also a decline, at least for some years. According to Ringe (2013), this happened in                 
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Germany in particular, attributed to a reform of the law of private limited companies              
(MoMiG), but our figures also show some reversals of the general trend for Spain, Denmark,               
Belgium and Austria. However, overall, the number of newly incorporated foreign ltds has             
continued to rise. Thus, we do not confirm Ringe’s assessment of a mere ‘flash in the pan’. 
It can also be seen that most changes happened a number of years after the landmark case of                  
Centros (see 2.1, above); it therefore follows that this judgment alone did not give businesses               
from other Member States the confidence to establish a company in the UK. Similarly, it is                
noticeable that in the post-2004 Member States the stark rise in UK incorporations only came               
a few years after their accession to the EU. Thus, this also justifies a cautious assessment of                 
the effectiveness of the case law of the Court of Justice for corporate mobility in the EU. 
4. Regression analysis: do differences in conflict of laws rules matter? 
4.1 Methodological considerations 
In order to assess the relevance of differences in conflicts of laws rules applicable to               
companies more formally the subsequent regression analysis is based on the cross-sectional            
data of currently incorporated companies. While time series data can be helpful to establish              
causal relationships, the aforementioned limitations of data availability mean that only the            
cross-sectional data enable us to analyse the relevance of differences in conflict of laws rules               
across all Member States. Likewise, it is not possible to analyse differences at the firm level                
since, for private companies, such information is unavailable on an EU-wide basis (see 2.3,              
above). 
The incorporation data are count data. This indicates a Poisson or negative binomial             
distribution with a Generalized Linear Model (GLM). In the present case, negative binomial             
is preferred due to overdispersion, to be precise ‘negative binomial parameter estimated via             
ML’ in Stata. We use standard errors clustered by the countries of the commercial register,               
thus addressing the possibility that our data are correlated within groups of observations             
sharing the same country. 
In all of the subsequent models, we use the original data on companies with all managers                
from another Member State and the majority of them being shareholders. We then also              
control for the availability of the relevant data in Orbis and migration to the country of                
incorporation (see Table 6, below: ‘multiplicator’ and ‘migration’). This approach was           
preferred over the use of the adjusted data (see Table 2, above). The adjustment was based on                 
the assumption that migrants incorporate a company as frequently as the native population. It              
is also possible, however, that migrants are more likely to incorporate their own companies              
since it may be difficult for them to find employment in the public sector or local businesses.                 
Thus, the use of migration as an explanatory variable is helpful since it would also capture                
any higher (or lower) rate of incorporations per capita of the migrant population. 
In the regression analysis, we also consider the possible influence of the gaps in the data (see                 
2.3 and 3.1, above). Thus, in the main analysis we exclude the six countries with the most                 
limited data (below 5%), which are Belgium, Croatia, France, Greece, the Netherlands and             
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Sweden. To check the robustness of the findings, we also run regressions with all countries               
but the UK, the eleven countries with the most comprehensive data (above 50%), namely              
Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,           
and the UK, as well as all 28 Member States. 
4.2 Explanatory variables 
The case law of the Court of Justice has facilitated the incorporation of companies in other                
Member States (see 2.1, above). Still, there may be ‘remnants’ of the real seat theory in some                 
Member States, which might variously refer to the location of the administrative office or              
other fact-based criterions, in order to mitigate certain effects of a ‘pure’ incorporation             
theory. 
Table 4: ‘Incorporation theory score’ showing ‘pureness’ of incorporation theory under           
rules of conflicts of laws (private international law)  
Coding  Definition Countries 
1 
if a connecting factor based upon the incorporation theory is 
clearly formulated in legislation or through judge-made law 
(i.e. in a way that everyone, even non-experts, can grasp it) 
and no exceptions are provided (i.e. no additional connecting 
factors based upon the location of a company’s real seat). 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Finland, 
Hungary, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Malta, 
Netherlands, Slovakia, 
Sweden, UK 
2/3 
if (i) the situation that a connecting factor based upon the 
incorporation theory is clearly formulated but that this 
criterion is subject to exceptions, or (ii) that legal experts can 
identify that the country follows a connecting factor based 
upon the incorporation theory and no exceptions are provided 
but non-experts are uncertain about this position. 
Austria, Belgium, 
Croatia, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Romania, Slovenia, 
Spain 
1/3 as in previous scenario (ii) but exceptions to the incorporation theory clearly exist. 
Denmark, Greece, 
Latvia, Luxembourg 
0 
scenario where even legal experts cannot identify that the 
country follows a connecting factor based upon the 
incorporation theory 
Poland, Portugal 
We classify the level of ‘pureness’ of the incorporation theory in four categories, as shown in                
the definitions in Table 4. The two main considerations are, first, whether there are              
exceptions to the incorporation theory, for example, special rules that deviate from the             
primary connecting factor of the place of incorporation for some questions of company law              
(which may be allowed under EU law, see 2.1, above). Secondly, we code whether the               
incorporation theory is clearly and explicitly formulated in legislation or through judge-made            
law; thus, this second factors considers whether there is sufficient legal certainty for someone              
who is not a legal expert, say, a businessperson without legal training, to be confident about                
the practical feasibility of cross-border corporate mobility in the EU. 
In addition, in some Member States, rules of substantive company law contain requirements             
for companies to establish or maintain a specific connection to the territory of the Member               
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State. The case law of the Court of Justice accepted that this (mere) regulation of domestic                
companies is compatible with the freedom of establishment (see 2.1, above). Table 5 provides              
a definition of any such territorial restrictions under substantive company law.  
Table 5: ‘Territorial flexibility score’ showing whether substantive company law is free            
from real seat elements 
Coding  Definition Countries 
1 
if domestically incorporated companies do 
not have to have their headquarters or any 
other fact-based criteria on the domestic 
territory 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, UK 
½ 
if domestic companies should have some 
fact-based connection to the domestic 
territory but this rule is uncertain 
Poland 
0 
if there is a requirement that companies 
have to have their headquarters on the 
domestic territory 
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Greece, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovenia, 
Spain 
Based on these two sets of definitions, and with the information collected in a detailed               
comparative analysis (Gerner-Beuerle et al., 2016 and 2018b), we coded the laws of the              
Member States according to the ‘pureness’ of the incorporation theory and the substantive             
company law being free from territorial real seat elements (see again Tables 4 and 5). Any                
such restrictions tend to derive from the established position of the domestic laws prior to the                
case law of the Court of Justice and are therefore exogenous to variations in the prevalence of                 
foreign-based companies today. In detail, it can be seen that some countries follow the same               
liberal approach for both questions (e.g., the UK, Sweden, Slovakia); however, there are also              
cases where conflicts of laws and substantive company law have evolved differently, for             
example, compare Lithuania (which only scores highly in Table 4) and Portugal (which only              
scores highly in Table 5). As indicated above, there is also the difference that the pureness of                 
incorporation theory reflects the case law of the Court of Justice, while the question of               
whether substantive company law is free from real seat elements is merely a matter of               
domestic preferences. Overall, there is therefore only a modest positive correlation between            
these two variables of 0.37. 
The decision to incorporate in a foreign country can also be driven by a number of other                 
factors. For this purpose, we use various control variables reported in Table 6. The main aim                
is to test whether other characteristics of the country of incorporation may be more important               
than conflict of laws rules. Further control variables account for the closeness of the country               
pairs. We also considered that the data on private companies as they exist today are likely to                 
be influenced by both the recent past and the present: while the past is of importance for the                  
incorporation decision, the present is also relevant since companies that still exist today make              
the implicit choice to keep the present legal form. 
Table 6: Description of explanatory variables 
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Name Description  
(for ​country of incorporation​ unless 
stated otherwise) 
Source 
Incorporation 
theory score 
‘Pureness’ of incorporation theory 
under rules of conflicts of laws 
(private international law) 
Own research, see Table  4 and 
accompanying text 
 
Territorial 
flexibility score 
Substantive company law free from 
real seat elements 
Own research, see Table  5 and 
accompanying text 
Incorporation 
costs  
 
Indicator that measures minimum 
capital, costs, procedures and time 
for establishing a company 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/explore
topics/starting-a-business  
Corporate tax 
rates  
Corporate tax rate  https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/servic
es/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-onl
ine/corporate-tax-rates-table.html  
Rule of law Rule of Law score based on World 
Governance Indicators 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/i
ndex.aspx#home  
Legal origin Dummy variable for countries of 
the same legal origin (English, 
French, German and Nordic) 
La Porta et al., 2008, data available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/publicati
ons/economic-consequences-legal-origins  
Official 
language 
Official language of country pairs http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/publications/
wp/abstract.asp?NoDoc=3877  
Geographic 
distance 
Distances between the cities 
constituting the economic centres 
between country pairs, weighted by 
share of country’s population 
as previous 
Population  Population (in million) http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explai
ned/index.php/Population_and_population
_change_statistics  
Companies per 
capita 
Limited companies (as reported in 
Orbis) per capita 
Own calculations, see 3.1 above 
Multiplicator Factor correcting for variations in 
data availability 
Own calculations, see 3.1 above 
Migration Number of international migrants http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/po
pulation/migration/data/estimates2/estimat
es15.shtml 
Manager 
country score 
‘Pureness’ of incorporation theory 
in the country of the managers 
Own research, see Table 4 and 
accompanying text 
Country 
dummies 
Dummy variables for each country 
of the managers (with the UK as the 
reference category) 
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Apart from conflict of laws rules, it could rather be low incorporation costs, low corporate tax                
rates and a good rule of law rating of the country of incorporation that attract foreign                
businesses. With respect to the possible relevance of corporate tax law, it is worth noting that                
the concept of tax residence diverges from the mere formal registered seat and is normally a                
fact-intense criterion, which, for instance, considers the place of a company’s business or its              
headquarter (see Maisto, 2009). Thus, such a variable is unlikely to be significant for              
companies that only have a ‘letterbox’ in the incorporation country while doing business in              
another Member State. However, it is likely to be relevant for companies that have some               
physical connection to the country of incorporation – with the consequence that the tax              
authorities apply domestic tax law, despite the fact that the company’s managers are based              
abroad.  Such scenarios are within the scope of the present analysis (see 3.2, above). 21
More generally, it can be speculated that businesses may not choose a legal system by way of                 
incorporation that is too unfamiliar to them. Thus, the variable on whether countries belong to               
the same ‘legal origin’ aims to account for this factor, using the categories of English, French,                
German or Nordic legal origin for all European countries, as reported in the most recent               
studies of this line of research (La Porta et al., 2008; Djankov et al., 2003 also had the                  
category of ‘socialist legal origin’). The use of this variable should not be regarded as an                
endorsement of the alleged importance of ‘legal origins’. Indeed, it is doubtful whether these              
Western ‘legal origins’ can be seen as globally valid categories (Siems, 2016). However,             
given the mere European scope of this paper, there could be still some relevance of               
differences in the historical ‘legal origins’ between European countries.  
Of course, not only legal similarities may play a role. Language could matter since              
registration of a company typically requires the use of the official language of the respective               
country. It can also be relevant as far as the choice of a place of incorporation may mean that                   
the founders may become involved in legal disputes in the target country. Geography is likely               
to matter for businesses that operate in a border region – which can also mean that the main                  
place of business could be in the neighbouring country. The population of the incorporation              
country could also be relevant. In the US, the popularity of the small state of Delaware is                 
partly due to the fact that Delaware can focus on being attractive to incorporations from other                
states while more populous states have to balance more diverse interests. But the reverse is               
also possible: countries with a larger population being considered as a more secure choice for               
incorporating a company. This variable also controls for the effect that some of the              
companies in question may do some business in their country of incorporation and may              
therefore benefit from the larger market of this country. 
The control variable of ‘companies per capita’ may capture a variety of factors. Some of               
those factors overlap with reasons already mentioned, such as costs of incorporation, but this              
variable also tests whether, more generally, the form of the private limited company is              
popular in the country of incorporation. To some extent, this variable may also capture the               
question whether countries attract more companies if they give preference to either the             
interests of shareholders or directors (for this topic see e.g. Fluck and Mayer, 2005). In               
21 Or where, in practice, tax authorities are not fully informed as regards the factual connections of the company 
to another country, or are lenient in the way they apply the law as regards this connection. 
20 
 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics 
Vol. 56, 14-27. Published version available from: ​https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2018.05.002 
Accepted version made available from SOAS Research Online from:  ​http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25962/​ under 
CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International License 
addition, it should be noted that the principal-agent problems of corporate governance and the              
corresponding question about the strength of shareholder rights are mainly topics of large             22
listed companies with at least some separation between ownership and control, whereas the             
present study is concerned with small private companies in which the majority of the              
managers are identical with the companies’ shareholders.  
Finally, as regards the country of incorporation, the control variables ‘multiplicator’ and            
‘migration’ are necessary since the regression analysis uses the original data of companies as              
available in Orbis (see already 4.1, above). We also checked whether there may be problems               
of multicollinearity; yet, none of the variables have a correlation of more than |0.5|. 
With respect to the country of the managers, we also consider the respective conflict of laws                23
rules of this country. While the case law of the Court of Justice places restrictions on Member                 
States’ rules in so far as they apply vis-à-vis foreign companies, a number of ambiguities               
remain (see 2.1, above). These ambiguities often stem from differences between Member            
States as to the exact scope of company law, and its boundaries with other areas of law, and                  
often primarily affect foreign-incorporated companies (for details see Gerner-Beuerle and          
Schuster, 2014). The existence of a ‘pure’ incorporation theory may thus not be the main               
concern for businesses seeking incorporation in a Member State, as long as any remnants of               
the real seat theory only affect companies incorporated elsewhere. However, beyond just            
measuring the closeness of a country’s conflict of laws rules to the incorporation theory, the               
incorporation theory score may well proxy for other features of a national legal system.              24
Where a national company law is designed to give maximum freedom to shareholders in the               
internal organisation of private companies, the choice of a foreign company law for doing              
business in that Member State is unlikely to be regarded as problematic by the legislature in                
the real seat state: after all, most features of the foreign company law so chosen would also                 
have been available under the company law of the real seat state. Since the real seat                
doctrine’s most important effect is to assert regulatory sovereignty over all business activity             
carried out in a particular jurisdiction, thereby reducing or negating choice of law, it may be                
expected that the original choice of that approach and the preservation of some of its elements                
post-​Centros correlates with the existence of mandatory rules of substantive company law            
which shareholders would not choose voluntarily. Thus, ​prima facie one may expect that the              
conflict of laws rules in both the country of incorporation and in the real seat state might                 
influence the incorporation decision. 
Beyond these specific considerations, that there could also be many unobservable reasons            
that may determine why people from a particular country may want to incorporate a private               
company in the first place. For example, this may be due to country differences in innovation                
or in bankruptcy, labour and social security laws. It is beyond the scope of this paper’s focus                 
on the relevant factors in the country of incorporation to examine details of these laws. Thus,                
22 For one of the quantitative datasets, coding the law of public companies, see www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/datasets/. 
23 Based on their nationality but controlling for migration through the corresponding variable. 
24 For instance, historic reliance on the real seat doctrine as well as preservation, post-​Centros​, of some elements 
of that doctrine in a Member State’s conflict of laws rules may be correlated with company law rules aimed at 
protecting non-shareholder constituencies. 
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dummy variables for the country of the managers are included in order to consider any of                
those factors. While this reduces the degrees of freedom by up to 27 (if all countries are                 
included, see the next section), the number of observations remains well above the             
recommendation to have at least ten observations per parameter for categorical dependent            
variables such as count data (Long and Freese, 2001: 65; generally also Harrell, 2015: 72).  
4.3 Regression results 
The first three regression outputs report, in Table 7, the results excluding the six countries               
with the most limited data (see 4.1, above). They are therefore based on 22 (place of                
incorporation) x 27 (place of business) = 594 observations. 
Table 7: Negative binomial regressions (1) – dependent variable: number of companies            
with all managers being citizens of another Member State and more than half of those               
managers also being the shareholders of the company 
Independent variables: Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 Coefficients and significance  IRR 
Coefficients and 
significance  
Coefficients and 
significance  
Incorporation theory score 2.080279 ** 8.006701 1.469544 * 2.080279 ** 
Territorial flexibility score -0.81764   0.441472 -0.79025   -0.81764   
Costs of incorporation 0.104062 ** 1.10967 0.083438 * 0.104062 ** 
Corporate tax rate -0.07587   0.926937 -0.0331   -0.07587   
Rule of law -0.60188   0.547779 -0.72458   -0.60188   
Legal origin 0.763907 ** 2.146644 0.750229 ** 0.763907 ** 
Official language 1.607175 ** 4.9887 1.242886 * 1.607175 ** 
Geographic distance -0.00135 ** 0.998655 -0.00144 ** -0.00135 ** 
Population (mn) 0.061998 ** 1.06396 0.061998 ** 0.061998 ** 
Companies per capita       13.93519 *     
Multiplicator -0.14319 * 0.866586 -0.31475 ** -0.14319 * 
Migrants 3.40E-06   1.000003 3.63E-06   3.4E-06   
Manager country score      1.872318  
Country dummies #    #  #  
Constant -0.44684   0.639647 0.630225       
Log pseudolikelihood -2825.45     -2802.81   -2825.45   
  n=594     n=594   n=594   
Note: ** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level;  
# dummy variables for the country of the managers (individual values not shown)  
These results show that, as far as the legal variables are concerned, the incorporation theory               
score, the costs of incorporation and legal origin are consistently statistically significant, but             
not the variables on the territorial flexibility score, corporate tax law and the rule of law.  
The lack of significance of the territorial flexibility score is not implausible as it is doubtful                
how important any such restriction of substantive company law is in practice. It is not clear                
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how far any requirement of a fact-based connection to the territory can be checked by the                
commercial registers – or, indeed, why registers would have an incentive to do so. For               
example, in Estonia, which we coded as having such a requirement, the country report of the                
underlying project states that in reality ‘there is no effective mechanism that would restrict              
the foreign-administrated companies to be registered in Estonia’ (Hoffmann in          
Gerner-Beuerle et al., 2018b) At a practical level, this specific insight is also confirmed by               
the fact that there are various service providers that offer quick and uncomplicated             
incorporation in Estonia to foreign businesses (see 3.2, above). 
The variables about official language and geography are significant with the expected signs.             
In a further model (not reported here), we also examined the role of the spoken language, but                 
it was found to be less significant than the official language. The variable on population               
shows that, in the EU, larger countries have an advantage in attracting foreign incorporations.              
Model (2) includes the variable on ‘companies per capita’ and confirms that other factors              
may play a role for the incorporation decision. However, the incorporating score also retains              
its significance; thus, it is not simply a proxy for such other differences. Model (3) adds the                 
incorporation theory score of the country of the managers. It is insignificant, which is likely               
to be the result of the complex factors that account for the choices managers make when                
incorporating a private company.  
In further regressions, not reported here, we also checked a number of other combinations              
and variations of the variables (e.g., dropping variables, such as the ones on substantive law               
or legal origin; dropping the incorporation theory score for the country of incorporation but              
not the country of the managers) without changes to the results. As additional robustness              
checks we scaled the dependent variable per capita and per log GDP and run corresponding               
regressions using a gamma GLM with log link, applied to model (1): here too the results are                 
unchanged for the main variables of interest and there are only minor changes for some of the                 
additional control variables (namely that the multiplicator loses its significance in the first             
variation and that official language drops to a 5% significance level in the second one). 
Table 8: Interpretation of coefficients in model (1) of Table 7, above 
Independent variables: Coefficients and 
significance 
Change per 1 Unit 
Increase (IRR) 
Change per 
Standard 
Deviation 
Incorporation theory score 2.080279 ** 700.67% 213.79% 
Territorial flexibility score -0.8176418  -55.85% -26.54% 
Costs of incorporation 0.1040623 ** 10.97% 68.23% 
Corporate tax rate -0.0758701  -7.31% -50.42% 
Rule of law -0.6018829  -45.22% -27.66% 
Legal origin 0.7639068 ** 114.66% 52.92% 
Official language 1.607175 ** 398.87% 75.38% 
Geographic distance -0.0013462 ** -0.13% -97.55% 
Population 6.20E-08 ** 0.00% 143.22% 
Multiplicator -0.143194 * -13.34% -127.28% 
Migrants 3.40E-06  0.00% 31.68% 
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The coefficients of count data regressions do not lend themselves to intuitive interpretation as              
easily as OLS models. However, it is possible to say that a coefficient of x means that a                  
change in the respective independent variable of 1 will result in a multiplication of the               
predicted count by e​x (see Winkelmann 2008: 70; Coxe et al. 2009: 124). Table 7 reports                
these ‘incidence rate ratios’ (IRR) for model (1) and Table 8 provides further ways to               
interpret the coefficients of this model. The column ‘change per 1 unit increase’ in Table 8                
enables the calculation of an effect of changes to this variable, holding the other variables               
constant. The next column follows the same approach but examines the percentage impact of              
a one standard deviation increase. This is the best way to compare the effects of the                
individual variables. It can be seen that the incorporation theory score plays the largest role,               
followed by the population, geographic distance, official language, costs of incorporation and            
legal origin. 
Table 9: Negative binomial regressions (2) – dependent variable: as Table 7 
Independent variables: Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 Coefficients and significance  
Coefficients and 
significance  
Coefficients and 
significance  
Incorporation theory score 3.382553 ** 2.104793 ** 1.578953 ** 
Territorial flexibility score -0.95515  -0.65626  -0.69515  
Costs of incorporation 0.10797 ** 0.101664 ** 0.063953 * 
Corporate tax rate -0.29792 ** -0.0836  -0.07589 * 
Rule of law 0.139134  -0.44879  -0.73922 * 
Legal origin 0.706026 * 0.749897 ** 0.762654 ** 
Official language 0.400527  1.388102 ** 1.171581 ** 
Geographic distance -0.00158 ** -0.00138 ** -0.0015 ** 
Population 8.04E-08 ** 5.75E-08 ** 3.60E-08 ** 
Multiplicator 0.685718  -0.16251 ** -0.13767 ** 
Migrants 7.79E-07  3.37E-06 * 3.22E-06 * 
Country dummies #  #  #  
Constant 0.833491  -0.133796  3.916033  
Log pseudolikelihood -1714.925  -3172.2658  -2865.7440  
 n=297  n=756  n=729  
Note: ** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level;  
# dummy variables for the country of the managers (individual values not shown)  
To further check the robustness of the findings, Table 9 reports the regression results for the                
specification of model (1) for modified country groups. Model (4) examines the eleven             
countries with the most comprehensive data and model (5) does so for all 28 Member States                
(even the six countries with the very limited data). Model (6) excludes the UK as a possible                 
outlier given that more than 50% of the foreign incorporations are registered in the UK (see                
3.1, above). It should be noted that this is a hypothetical scenario since in an EU without the                  
UK, it may well have been the case that a Member State with a similar law (such as Ireland or                    
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Cyprus, also given the significance of the ‘legal origins’ variable in all of the models) would                
have taken the position of the UK as a popular target destination.  25
The main results are unchanged in all of the three models. In model (4), the lower                
significance level for some of the variables is likely to be due to the lower number of                 
observations. In models (4) and (6) it is however also interesting to note that the variable on                 
the corporate tax rate is now statistically significant, with the expected negative sign. In              
addition, in model (6) the negative significance of the rule of law variable is likely to be due                  
to the popularity of some of the CEE countries as popular target destinations (see Table 2 in                 
3.1, above). 
It can be speculated that the lower rule of law score of a country may not always be against                   
the interest of companies since it may go hand in hand with lighter requirements in terms of                 
doing business. In this sense, model (4) may indicate a form of ‘market segmentation’,              
similar to the situation in the US (Barzuza, 2012; for Europe see also Zorzi, 2017): businesses                
which only aim at reducing the initial incorporation costs do so in the UK, while those which                 
also aim at reducing taxation (and have a general preference for laxer laws) incorporate in               
other Member States. 
The importance of differences in conflict of laws rules has also been confirmed in a               
corresponding empirical survey of lawyers from all Member States (Gerner-Beuerle et al.,            
2016: 65-99). Its main finding is that, despite the case law of the Court of Justice, there are                  
significant practical obstacles to corporate mobility in Europe. This shows in many of the              
survey answers and holds true for both the aggregate level of the responses and the analyses                
of the responses for particular groups of respondents. It also correlates with the fact that most                
of the survey respondents expressed support for EU harmonisation of conflict of laws rules              
applicable to companies. 
5. Conclusion 
The empirical research about corporate mobility in the EU has so far been limited in two                
respects: it has been focused on the analysis of foreign-based companies in the UK and it has                 
mainly been concerned with differences in the costs of incorporation. This paper had the aim               
to fill these gaps. 
In the descriptive statistics, based on data from all EU Member States, we confirmed that the                
UK is the most popular target destination. To a lesser extent, foreign incorporations also take               
place in other Member States. In particular, within Central and Eastern Europe Estonia,             
Romania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic are popular target destinations. However, the            
network analysis of these data also showed that the foreign incorporations typically happen             
between neighbouring countries with further linguistic, social and economic similarities; thus,           
the effect of the freedom of establishment on the mobility of companies across all Member               
States is still rather limited. The time series data of new incorporations in the UK also points                 
25 Indeed, it can now already be seen that, following the Brexit referendum, some of the incorporation agents 
promote Irish companies as an alternative to UK ltds, see, eg, https://go-ahead.de/; www.limited-kaufen.com/. 
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towards the limited effect of the case law of the Court of Justice. Finally, the regression                
analysis suggests that decisions about domestic or foreign incorporations are not merely a             
result of the differences in substantive company law, in particular the costs of incorporation.              
Rather, we found that conflict of laws rules plays a key role: countries that have a clear-cut                 
version of the ‘incorporation theory’ attract more incorporations than countries which have            
retained elements of the ‘real seat theory’. 
These findings can have important policy implications. They show that the case law of the               
Court of Justice has not made all differences in the conflicts of laws rules applicable to                
companies obsolete. Thus, a possible reading of these findings is that harmonisation of those              
rules may be recommended. The significant relationship between the ‘pureness’ of the            
incorporation theory and the use of a Member State’s companies by foreign incorporators             
also shows that EU harmonisation based on the incorporation theory would facilitate            
corporate mobility as one of the relevant policy considerations in this area (notwithstanding             
possible other considerations, see Gerner-Beuerle et al., 2016: 275-351). 
Following the result of the UK’s ‘Brexit referendum’ from June 2016, it is possible that, after                
the eventual departure of the UK from the EU, the dynamics will change (see also Armour et                 
al., 2017). For example, it could be suggested that other Member States will aim to fill the                 
gap that will be left by the UK as the ‘European Delaware’. However, it is also possible that                  
the UK keeps strong ties with the EU: in the (increasingly unlikely) event the UK agrees                
arrangements similar to those in place between the EU and Switzerland, there will be no               
necessary change to the position of foreign companies incorporated in the UK (and vice              
versa). Yet, even if the UK decided for a looser arrangement, it may be the case that a future                   
free trade arrangement would also cover the free movement of companies (cf. Sørensen,             
2016). Thus, while the present paper certainly is not be the final word on matters of corporate                 
mobility in the EU, it points towards the continuing need for empirically sound law-making              
in this field. 
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